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ABSTRACT. This paper analyses the evolution of the effects on educational inequality of early 
marriage by looking at the impact of whether women had married young on their children's 
schooling outcomes for 25-32 countries (Demographic and Health Surveys) in 2000 and 2010 for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. We also explore indirect pathways −mother's education, health and 
empowerment as well as community channels− operating from early marriage to child schooling 
and assess the presence of negative externalities for non-early married mothers and their children 
on education transmission in communities with large rates of child marriage. In our econometric 
analysis we employ OLS, matching, instrumental variables and pseudo-panel for a better 
understanding of changes over time. Our results show that early marriage is still a significant 
source of inequality, though its impact has decreased across time: girls born to early married 
mothers are between 6%-11% more likely to never been to school and 1.6%-1.7% to enter late, 
and 3.3%-5.1% less likely to complete primary school, whereas boys are between 5.2%-8.8% 
more likely to never been to school and 1%-1.9% to enter late, and 2.3%-5.5% less likely to 
complete primary school. Second, child marriage increases gender inequality within household’s 
with girls losing an additional 0.07 years of schooling as compared to boys if born to early 
married mothers. Third, our estimates show that mother's education and health mediate some of 
the effect of early marriage and that the large prevalence of child marriage in a community also 
impairs educational transmission for non-early married mothers. Fourth, empowering of young 
wives can weaken other channels of transmission of education inequalities. Overall, our findings 
highlight the need to target these children with the appropriate interventions and support to 
achieve the greater focus on equity in the global post-2015 education agenda.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: early marriage; intergenerational transmission; education; community; 
empowerment; sub-Saharan Africa.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Dakar Framework for Action set at the World Education Forum in 2000 established an 
ambitious six Education for All (EFA) goals to be achieved by 2015. In relation to the goal of 
achieving access to education for all, there has been an improvement in net enrolment ratios with 
more children enrolled in school during the last decade in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), however, 
among the poorest children the chances of completing primary education still remains low 
(Akyeampong, 2009; UNESCO, 2014; World Bank, 2011). Besides poverty, cultural traditions, 
and gender violence, the incidence of early marriage is a major reason for disadvantaged groups, 
particularly poor girls, not making as much progress in enrolling and completing primary 
education (Lee-Rife et al., 2012; Loaiza and Wong, 2012;  Malhotra et al., 2011).  
Although the incidence of early marriage and its impact on educational access is widespread 
and well documented (see, for instance: Carmichael, 2011; Delprato et al., 2015; Erulkar, 2013; 
Field and Ambrus, 2008;  Godha, Gage and Hotchkiss, 2012; Jensen and Thornton, 2003; Raj 
and Boehmer, 2013), children of early married mothers is a group that has received little research 
and policy attention. In particular, research that has looked at the impact of marrying young on 
children's educational opportunities and the pathways through which this occurs, as well as the 
implication on gender gap, has been lacking. Understanding the factors underpinning the 
transmission of educational inequalities from early married mothers to their children in sub-
Saharan Africa is important for developing policies and programmes that tackle the 
intergenerational effects of early marriage on educational access for adolescent girls. Besides, 
because daughters of young wives are more at risk of not accessing or completing primary 
education because of social norms on age of marriage and related parental aspirations (Maertens, 
2013), understanding the factors that promote early marriage for this group will help to 
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understand what policies are likely to make a difference.  Moreover, this is key to achieving 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG4) and in particular goal 5 which makes an explicit call for 
the elimination of "child, early and forced marriage" (UN, 2015).  
In this paper, we use the term early marriage, also known as child marriage, to mean legal or 
customary marriage between two people, of whom one or both spouses is below the age of 18 
(Article 1, Convention of the Rights of the Child, CRC).1 We focus on girls, and define early 
married mothers or young wives (henceforth denoted as EMM) as those who enter marriage 
before the age of 18. We chose to focus on sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) because of the high 
prevalence of the early marriage of young adolescent girls. According to UNICEF, currently, out 
of the 10 countries with the highest rates of early marriage 7 are in SSA (UNICEF, 2014). It is 
estimated that 700 million women will be married before age 18 by 2050 and that SSA will 
surpass South Asia on the number and global share of child marriage. Even by doubling the 
current rate of decline, in 2050 SSA, will account for 47% of the total child marriage in the 
world (UNICEF, 2014). This makes focusing on the issue of child marriage critical and 
important to improving access to quality education for adolescent girls, and the importance of 
research which helps to map out the scale of the problem, but also produce insights into the 
factors responsible for its  prevalence in SSA. Findings from our study will also help to inform 
policies that have the potential to reduce its prevalence in SSA.  
In this paper, we estimate the impact of early marriage on children’s education for SSA, 
looking for changes in this relationship across time and taking stock on whether child marriage is 
a source of educational inequality. We analyse 25 to 32 countries (Demographic and Health 
Surveys) around the year 2000 (wave 1) and 2010 (wave 2) drawing on a range of child 
education indicators. We also investigate indirect pathways (mother's education, health and 
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empowerment2 as well as community channels) operating from early marriage to child schooling 
and, by focusing on non-EMM and their children, we explore the nature of negative externalities 
on the transmission of education in communities with high incidence of child marriage. The 
analysis is performed separately for boys and girls to establish if early marriage, not only 
diminishes education investments on children, but also if it contributes to widening gender 
inequality within households.  
We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) and matching techniques as well as instrumental 
variables (IV) to account for the plausible endogeneity in the early marriage-children schooling 
relationship. Moreover, we construct a pseudo panel which in our view offers a better 
understanding of change over time in comparison to analysis of each wave separately.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on how 
early marriage translates into lower schooling for children. In Section 3, we present a model 
linking early marriage and empowerment, because of the importance of the latter in addressing 
the former. Section 4 presents the data and Section 5 describes the alternative econometric 
approaches used. In section 6, we present the main empirical findings and robustness analysis. 
Finally, in section 7, we conclude with a discussion of the implications and present key 
recommendations from our analysis.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND  
(a) Theoretical perspective on early marriage  
Early marriage can have several effects on educational opportunities for young children.  How 
early marriage affects children's education requires that we understand what lies behind the 
phenomenon. Decisions on child marriage need to be understood beyond parental preferences 
that are self-regarded, they  should also consider other type of non
role of social expectations.  
How does one explain the incidence of child marriage?  According to analysis by 
Jiang and Lindemans (2014), 
early marriage is not an exception. 
individual behaviours which 
Thus, for early marriage to be a social norm
(empirical expectations) and think should be done (normative
can categorise different types of practice of early marriage 
preferences and beliefs that 
categories of early marriage.  
Diagram 1. Categorisation of early marriage based on preferences and beliefs. 
and Lindemans, 2014) 
 
The diagram shows whether child marriage is 
descriptive norm or a social norm. Knowing this is
Depend on 
unconditional 
expectations
Based on 
self-interest
Rational response 
or custom 
[category 1]
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ultimately relies on what constitutes and drives child marriage. For example, there can be 
incentives to marry girls young as wealth transfers from the bride's family to the groom at the 
time of marriage (dowry) are lower if brides are young and uneducated (Maertens and Chari, 
2012). This makes the collective practice of child marriage a rationale response (category 1) as it 
is rooted in self-interest. Also, when parental personal normative beliefs (such as to preserve 
virginity before marriage and protection of girls' sexuality) are important, forcing daughters to 
marry young is a route to accomplished this (Khanna et al., 2013). In this case child marriage is 
classified as a moral rule. Moreover, when child marriage decisions are more strongly shaped by 
social expectations (where failure to conform can result in disapproval or shame for the family 
within the community for example), child marriage falls into categories 3 and 4. Rational 
responses behind child marriage can be weaken by changing economic incentives behind it, 
whilst if child marriage is a social norm changes can only occur collectively, in a coordinated 
way (Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014).  
(b) Factors influencing education outcomes and early marriage 
 
The educational choice of households make for their children often depends on the expected 
returns and costs of education and household's income especially if family are credit constrained 
(Black and Devereux, 2011), but it also depends on the aspiration of parents (Genicot and Ray, 
2015). Restricted investments in schooling may be due to, low parental aspirations because of 
their low education (Chevalier, Denny and McMahon, 2009), which can also be influenced 
further by family composition (number of children and also gender composition) that puts a 
strain on the distribution of resources and opportunity costs of schooling (Nishimura and 
Yamano, 2013). Gender-cultural factors, in particular, can be a further obstacle to educate girls 
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(Glick, 2008). Overall, these factors operate at different levels: individual, household, 
community, cultural. 
Individual factors are particularly key. Children's ability and gender can influence the levels 
of educational investments made by parents. There is a genetic component in the transmission of 
ability −the nature component− (Becker and Tomes, 1986; Behrman et al., 1995) which directly 
influences the expected returns that children would obtain from further schooling. What is more, 
cognitive abilities can be setback for lack of care around birth. Young married girls start child-
bearing soon after marriage with increased health risks from complications in pregnancy and 
death during delivery, low-birth weight, and high risk of infant mortality coupled with short-birth 
spacing (Godha, Hotchkiss and Gage, 2013; Raj and Boehmer, 2013). More importantly, young 
wives' nutrition can decline during pregnancy, and coupled with a lack of maternal health care 
services and vaccinations' usage (Singh, Rai and Singh, 2012; Singh, Kumar and Pranjali, 2014), 
this can have long-term effects on children's cognitive abilities and their associated educational 
returns. In other words, by having children at a young age, young mothers risk transmitting 
genetic disadvantage that can affect the child’s cognitive abilities and limit the returns from 
investing in their education.  For example, health as a channel can result in fewer education 
investments through its impact on the cognitive abilities of the children of EMM. Educational 
investments also depend on a child's gender which traverses all levels. Families and communities 
may see girls as having little importance outside of their roles as wives, with any benefits 
perceived to accrue to the future husbands' families, while boys are given preference in the belief 
that they will look after their parents (Huisman and Smits, 2009).  
Household factors, equally play an important role. Within the family level, there is a mixture 
of determinants of children's education, ranging from wealth, demographic factors, parental 
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education, and more specific factors linked to child marriage such as dowry, mother's 
employment and autonomy. In developing countries, household's wealth is vital when deciding 
on educational investments. Parents, especially if they are poor, tend to consider the benefits of 
schooling (increased earnings) against direct costs  (e.g., fees, uniforms, textbooks, travel costs) 
and indirect costs (e.g., helping with household chores, work on family enterprises or paid 
labour, looking after siblings) (Nishimura and Yamano, 2013). For poor households, if they 
perceive the benefits of investing in education to be low, they may be less willing to invest their 
meagre resources in educating their child.  This could lead to pressure on the child to contribute 
to household income through work.  Besides, opportunity costs can be large for poor families, 
especially when demographic factors (such as short birth spacing) put an additional strain on 
family resources (Longwe and Smits, 2012; Webbink, Smits and De Jong, 2012). In a study 
about the demand for schooling in two African countries, Lincove (2015) finds that the most 
common reasons cited by parents of out-of-school children in Nigeria, is work (29%) and then 
school costs (21%), whereas in Uganda it is school costs (reported by parents for 32% of out-of-
school children).  
As a mechanism of intergenerational transfer of human capital, parental education is 
paramount (Chevalier, Denny and McMahon, 2009). Parental education has an impact on current 
income which in turn affect children’s educational attainment. The literature on child 
development, highlights that mother’s education in particular has a major influence on child’s 
educational attainment (Haveman and Wolfe, 1994; LeVine et al., 2011). Because early marriage 
has negative effects on mother's education (Delprato et al., 2015; Field and Ambrus, 2008; Lloyd 
and Mensch, 2008), we anticipate that the correlation between the education of EMM and their 
children to be stronger.3 Moreover, EMM lower education levels constrains their employment 
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opportunities and diminishes their agency or empowerment (decision-making power) within 
households, and as a result they are less likely to have strong influence on children's educational 
decisions. For instance, Solanke (2015) finds that, in Nigeria, the probability of women to be in 
the high empowerment category is increased twofold for those married between age 15-19 than 
those married at age 14 or less. Likewise, Durrant and Satharn (2000) show that empowered 
women in Pakistan are more able to positively invest in their children increasing their chances of 
ever attending school. 
Additionally, other household's factors related to early marriage (e.g., dowry) operate at 
different levels. Dowry is a cultural factor which can also be driven by economic reasons. It sets 
back aspirations on girls' education by creating incentives to marry girls young and, equally, the 
bride's price −i.e., the amount paid by the groom to the parents of a bride for marrying consent− 
often increases, the younger the bride. This creates an economic incentive to marry girls young 
to save and obtain wealth, especially for households in economic hardship (Field and Ambrus, 
2008). In other contexts, such as when the bride leaves her natal family to live in her husband’s 
household, dowry can be a mechanism to heighten a bride's autonomy (Chan 2014).  
Community level factors also play an important role. Local communities can transmit beliefs 
on early marriage are endorsed (Bicchieri, Jiang and Lindemans, 2014), with most early marriage 
arrangements in SSA more prevalent in rural communities. Loaiza and Wong (2012) report that 
on average, for 48 countries in the last 10 years, nearly 70% of total child marriage happened in 
rural areas. In rural areas the lack of good educational facilities and infrastructure, long distances 
to school, means communities are often isolated and have safety concerns. Households may 
therefore postpone the decision to send children to school until they are older (Glick and Sahn, 
2006). Overage enrolment for girls increases the risk of early marriage before they complete 
11 
basic education (Akyeampong et. al., 2012). In effect, the location of schools and security 
concerns can constrain education participation for children living in rural communities, which 
particularly affects rural girls. Also, because labour market opportunities are confined in rural 
communities and agricultural jobs requires little education, returns on girls' education returns can 
be limited in rural areas and further amplify the gender gap (Colclough et al., 2000). This is 
compounded by the fact that young wives tend to marry men working in low-skilled manual and 
farm occupations (Khanna, Verma and Weiss, 2013), and who are also likely to have lower and 
gender-bias aspirations in rural locations because of poverty traps.4  
Early marriage in rural communities is mostly a community-driven phenomenon because it 
depends on social expectations formed in close networks who believe they ought to conform 
(Bicchieri, Jiang and Lindemans, 2014). This leads to social pressure in communities with high 
prevalence of early marriage where failure to conform can result in disapproval for the family 
(Bayisenge, 2010; Srinivas, 2000). In those circumstances, child marriage is seen as a route to 
strengthen family ties, clan and tribal connections or political alliances and, sometimes, acts as a 
mechanism to settle obligations (UNFPA, 2006). 
There is also the element of cultural factors which in combination with economic inequalities 
might feed into each other, leading to gender inequality traps (World Bank, 2011; Morrisson and 
Jütting, 2005). At the individual level, cultural factors are closely tied to parent's aspirations and 
beliefs which shape social norms re-enforcing social structures on gender roles (Hiller, 2014). 
Cultural norms are prone to be stable, thereby gender inequality is reproduced over time due to 
slow-moving social norms (Cooray and Potrafke, 2011; Morrisson and Jütting, 2005). Early 
marriage is one of this persistent-harmful social norms endorsed by patriarchal norms which see 
girls as the property of fathers and husbands (Walker, 2012), with girls' education seen in some 
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settings as incompatible with the responsibilities and expectations of marriage. Beliefs about the 
ideal age of marriage for girls can constrain the education that parents aspire for their daughters.   
Maerten (2013), for example, finds that in rural India only 39% of the girls would be allowed by 
their parents to pursue higher education compared to 71% of the boys. In SSA, socio-cultural 
risk factors are underpinned by traditional social −male dominated− stratification structures that 
compound religion with customary practices to justify child marriage (Walker, 2012). This 
happens across religions in the region, either in the Christian traditional regions of Ethiopia or in 
the Muslim countries of Western Africa. Furthermore, discriminatory social norms are reflected 
in formal structures. Child marriage's laws are often not effective due to cultural factors because 
there are widespread exceptions from customary or religious laws (Loaiza and Wong, 2012).  
(c) Empowerement of early married mothers  
 
In this section we turn our attention to how women's empowerment within the family affects 
children educational opportunities, above all if women are married young. We argue that 
empowering women through education or other social and cultural initiatives or interventions 
can strengthen their ability to resist detrimental practice, such as early marriage, or strengthen 
their powers of negotiation to prevent early marriage and the consequences which follow, as we 
have outlined above. As Arestoff and Djemai (2016) have argued “young women being more 
empowered means that women from recent generations are more empowered than their 
counterparts from older generations … with one explanation being changes in educational 
attainment" (p. 70). Many key development outcomes depend on women's ability to negotiate 
favourable intra-household allocations of resources (Doss, 13; Duflo, 2012), and which can also 
influence choices they make regarding their girl child’s education. A woman is not considered to 
be empowered if, for example, “she does not take part in household decisions” (Arestoff and 
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Djemai, 2016: p. 71).  If women are involved in decisions about life-choices, for example when 
they choose to marry and their children’s schooling, this can lead to greater agency for later 
generation of women (Arestoff and Djemai, 2016). 
The role of women’s empowerment on demographic outcomes has been documented in a 
number contexts affecting contraceptive use and reproductive choices (Larsson and Stanfors, 
2014; Upadhyay and Karasek, 2012), violence (Dalal; 2011; Uthman, Lawoko and Moradi, 
2010) and children's nutrition and education outcomes (Guilbert, 2013; Imai et al., 2014). Thus, 
we place a high value on women’s empowerment when it comes to addressing the phenomenon 
of EMM.  
Our review of the literature revealed that EMM affects education outcomes through three 
channels: (1) maternal education, (2) health, (3) community.  We hypothesize that young wives’ 
early marriage status impacts negatively on their childrens’ education once community and 
family factors are controlled for. Also, young wives low education limits their bargaining power 
within the household affecting the educational prospects of their daughters more than their sons. 
This could be due to lower aspiration for girls’ education in the communities of EMM which can 
be conflated by dowry effects. Our main argument is that, more empowered women have a better 
chance of limiting the effects of these factors and reducing the transmission of educational 
inequalities from EMM to their children. We have surmised from the literature review that early 
married mother’s children are likely to get less education as a result of their low education, risk 
to poor health, and community values on education.  Empowering EMM has the potential to 
limit health, education and community effects on transmission of inequalities.  
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3.  THEORETICAL BARGAINING  MODEL  
In this paper, the theoretical model guiding our econometric specification builds on the 
household collective models where household's members have different preferences, with the 
implication that modifications of individual-specific control over resources translates into 
changes in resource allocation patterns (Chiappori 1997). If women’s voice and powers of 
negotiation are strengthened this can have a positive impact on their bargaining power and 
control over resources. In particular, we use the idea that the bargaining process over the sharing 
rule of resources −i.e., the amount agreed that each member of the household is allowed to spend 
of the remaining income after expenditures in public goods (Chiappori,  1997, p. 43) − depends 
on a set of environmental factors or opportunities of spouses outside marriage (Chiappori et al. 
2002). Some studies exploit this to examine how empowerment and marriage affect children's 
investments (see Fafchamps et al., 2009; Park, 2007), but not with a separate analysis for early 
marriage. We go a step further, and in our model, the key direct environmental factor is early 
marriage.  
We now formally define the model.5 The discounted utility for groom i derived from 
marrying potential bride j is  = (, 	; ) where  is the sharing rule, and for the 
bride j is 	 = 	(, 	; ), where A represents premarital endowment for men (m) and 
women (f). Welfare maximisation by the household can be defined as a solution to the problem: 
max() + 1 − 	((1 − )) subject to  = (, 	) (1) 
where  is the welfare weight which depends on the environmental factor  and  represents 
the budget constraint. Maximizing (1) yields a division of welfare between spouses which 
depends on the sharing rule; with  being increasing in  and hence in the environmental factor 
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 (Fafchamps et al., 2009). Our assumption is that, bargaining power and bargaining abilities of 
spouses depend on expected share of assets on divorce and crucially on  −the relative 
bargaining effectiveness − which in our context is strongly affected by early marriage  (a 
component of the contextual factors ). That is, how much women can derive from the 
household utility and those of their children by the sharing rule is influenced by the effectiveness 
of their bargain which is a inverse function of marrying young:  =  !(), where  ∈
.  Household optimization (Park, 2007) leads to the following demand function for child's 
quality −education level or health status,  
#∗ =	#∗	(, 	 , ,p',h', )		 (2) 
where #∗ is the optional demand of children's schooling,  is total income, p' is a price vector, h' 
is a children's quality endowment vector and  is an indicator of early marriage. The main 
reason why early marriage affects schooling decisions of children is due to its overreaching 
importance as measure of empowerment itself as young wives' lack of full maturity at the time of 
marriage makes them especially vulnerable and subject to domestic violence and sexual abuse, 
and unable to make critical decisions about their children’s education.  This is reflected in lower 
autonomy on their education decisions (Carmichael, 2011; Murphy-Graham, 2010; Jensen and 
Thornton, 2003) and those of their children. We do not estimate the bargaining model but exploit 
its empirical implications.  
4. DATA 
Our analysis is based on DHS data from SSA (Measure DHS, 2013a). The DHS provides a wide 
range of information for all household members on health, nutrition as well as education. The 
DHS have the double advantage of providing nationally representative samples that are also 
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comparable across countries (Measure DHS, 2013b) and, vitally, that can link parental 
information to their children. For the first wave we employ and pool surveys around the year 
2000 (25 in total) and for the second wave the latest 32 available surveys (with 2010 as the 
average year).  
Table 1 displays the countries included and size of the working sample: women 30 to 39 
years old who first married or entered into union. Two reasons are behind the choice of the 
working sample. First, the lower bound of 30 years of age is chosen to overlap with children's 
educational outcomes which are approximately defined for children's age group between 8 (for 
never been to school) and age 17 (for primary completion). Second, the upper bound of 39 years 
is chosen as to not overlap with one of the instruments employed in the IV approach, past 
incidence of early marriage (based on the 40-49 cohort).   
 [Table 1 here] 
To provide a more comprehensive picture on transmission of educational inequality through 
early marriage, we make use of four indicators measuring different zones of educational 
exclusion which locate different populations whose access is denied or not likely to lead to a full 
completion of basic education (Lewin, 2009). These are: those who will never go to school (zone 
1); primary drop-outs (zone 2); primary enrolled but at a risk of drop out (zone 3).6  Never been 
to school, the first indicator, is defined as children who never attended school for the age group 
two years after a country official primary entry age plus three. The second indicator, overage in 
primary school (a group at risk of dropping out), comprises children attending primary two or 
more years older than the specific grade age. The third indicator, primary completion, is defined 
for those children aged between one year after primary official leaving age plus three.7 Finally, 
years of schooling is calculated for the age group 10 to 14.  
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As found in other studies (Lee-Rife et al., 2012; Loaiza and Wong, 2012), our working 
sample confirms there has been little improvement in lowering child marriage rates during the 
last decade in SSA (from 52% in wave 1 to 46% in wave 2, with a reduction of 3% from 18% for 
girls married before age 15).  Thus, a child born to EMM still poses a disadvantage to their 
education prospects. In both waves children of EMM are 10% less likely to complete primary 
compared to children of non-EMM, and are 10% more likely to be overage and between 20%-
12% more likely to have never accessed education (see Table 2). As expected, there are also 
important differences on background characteristics for the two groups. For instance, households 
of EMM have nearly an additional child than those from the non-EMM group. They are 40% 
more likely to be in the bottom quintile of the wealth distribution, and are 5% less likely to have 
attended secondary education compared to non-EMM. This gap is also observed at the 
community level –e.g. EMM communities have larger number of young children and stunting 
rates and lower rates of fathers in qualified occupations. 
[Table 2 here] 
Moreover, for each country, there is a direct linkage between child marriage and educational 
performance −countries with higher incidence of child marriage tend to show poorer educational 
performance. Figures 1 and 2 depict the distribution of prevalence of early marriage and 
educational performance (for wave 2). Figure 1 shows that darker shaded countries (mostly 
Western Africa countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea) where child marriage is 
severe, also have higher rates of out of school children and low primary completion rates above 
the regional average (Figure 2).  
 [Figures 1 and 2 here] 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
We employ various econometric techniques to account for the different issues which may bias 
the relationship of early marriage with children’s education. On the one hand, to derive robust 
relationships for cross-section estimations −controlling for selection on both observables and 
unobservable− we rely on OLS and matching techniques as well as IV to control for 
endogeneity. On the other hand, to look at changes in this relationship across time we use pseudo 
panel data models by combining the two waves of DHS data. 
(a) OLS and Double Robust Estimators 
We do not estimate the bargaining model as we do not have information on pre-marital variables. 
Instead, we estimate a reduced form of children schooling as a function of the bargaining 
indicator (captured by environmental factor early marriage ) and a set of children, household 
and community characteristics. There are three units of analysis in the regressions: the child (i), 
the household (h) and the community (k). The analysis is performed separately for boys and 
girls. For each wave we pool all countries and estimate by OLS the child schooling regression,  
)* = (+)* , )* , ,)* , -.*)	 (3) 
where )* denotes child's schooling indicators (never been to school, late entry, primary 
completion and years of education) for child i living in household h and community k. Our key 
independent variable is )* −whether the mother of the child had married young or before 18 
years old. Other covariates included are +)* which is a vector of child characteristics including 
age and birth order. The vector of household variables ,)* includes: number of boys and girls at 
home, household head male, mother's working, mother's religion Muslim, mother's body mass 
index (BMI). The vector of community variables -.* includes community health variables 
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(average number of children under 4, average stunting rate, proportion of underweight mothers), 
dummy for rural community and community socio-economic variables (development index 
based on household assets and proportion of fathers in with upper non-farm occupation).8 We 
also include country dummies and GDP. We also investigate indirect pathways operating from 
early marriage to child schooling by OLS regression (3) by sub-samples: parental education 
channel, health and empower channels and the ecological community channels (given by 
community location, fertility, education quality, and socio-economic characteristics).  
Because it is unreasonable to assume that marrying young is a random event, a comparison of 
children born to a young married mother to those whose mothers married later may be biased. In 
order to attenuate the selection bias generated by confounding factors and identify an appropriate 
counterfactual for the treated group of children (i.e., children born to young wives,  = 1), we 
adopt matching techniques (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The aim of matching is to find a 
group of non-treated children (born to mothers married after age 17,  = 0) who are similar to 
the treated children in all observed characteristics except for the variable early marriage. 
Matching allow us to account for the potential bias arising from a correlation between the 
treatment group and observed covariates.9 In particular, we are interested in estimating average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). The matching estimator used is a double robust estimator 
(Bang and Robins, 2005) which uses the same specification for estimating the propensity score 
and the outcome model. This estimator has the theoretical advantage that it yields unbiased 
estimates if either or both the propensity and outcomes are correctly specified −the double robust 
property which offers more protection against misspecification.  
(b) Instrumental variable (IV) approach 
There can be unobservables which can affect both the decision of early marriage and educational 
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outcomes which will biased its association, with educational differences of treated and untreated 
children explained by pre-existing characteristics of women who marry young versus those who 
marry later. To account for endogeneity, we employ two models with two instruments measured 
at the community level. In model 1, we use the proportion of non-premarital sex (0!) and the 
past prevalence of early marriage (01) and in model 2 we replace the later instrument with the 
female/gender ratio (02). We expect the instruments to be linked with decision of women to 
marry young. The proportion of non-premarital sex is an indication of the value the community 
attaches to girls' virginity and reflect safety concerns behind early marriage decisions. If families 
feel they cannot protect their daughters from latent risks, parents may consider early marriage as 
a safeguard against premarital sex and sexual harassment (Malhotra et al., 2011). Past prevalence 
of child marriage in a community is an indication of its cultural dimension with early marriage 
passed on through generations by social pressure (Bayisenge, 2010) whilst the female/male 
community ratio captures competition for future husbands.  
 We do not anticipate that the instruments to be strongly correlated with the error term. The 
value attached to virginity represents, as well as protection mechanism, a cultural dimension of 
communities which is no linked to socio-economic factors and so it is more likely to be valid. 
Past incidence of early marriage is based on community level aggregate and is it unlikely to have 
a direct impact on schooling at the individual level. Although instruments are validated by 
specification tests (see Section 6.a), we do not claim that IV estimates are unbiased. Our IV 
approach has the common drawbacks of cross-section analysis−results show at best conditional 
statistical correlations rather than causality.  
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(c) Pseudo Panel 
Here we combine the two rounds of DHS data using a pseudo panel which permit us to identify 
the determinants of children's schooling over the years. We construct the pseudo panel by 
aggregating datasets for each country by cohorts observed in both waves leaving 25 countries. 
To increase samples size before collapsing the data by cohorts, we employ a larger group of 
women −i.e., aged 30 to 49. Cohorts are defined based on year-of-birth brackets and the country 
of residence. Because age's distribution varies considerable between and within countries, we 
generate cohorts for each country based on quantiles for the mothers' age distribution rather than 
using fixed age groups. Specifically, for each country, we split the age distribution into 20 bins, 
guarantying a 5% of the total sample for each cohort c (c=1,..., C=20). Cohort c is defined as,  
3)*4444456 = (+3)*44444456, )*444444456, ,)*4444456, -.*4444456)	 (4) 
where the average is taken for each cohort c in time t (=1 for wave 1, and =2 for wave 2). The 
cohort's choice provides enough time variation and it maximises efficiency by using numerous 
cohorts, all of size above the minimum bound of 100 individuals per cell (Verbeek and Nijman, 
1992), to eliminate the bias of time-varying average cohort fixed effects (Deaton, 1985). The 
median cohort is of a reasonable size, varying across indicators from 93 for primary completion, 
249 for years of education, 292 for never been to school to 356 in the case of late entry.10 By 
transforming the pooled cross-section to a model of cohort means using (4) we generate a pseudo 
panel and estimate standard fixed and random effect models using panel data techniques, 
37 56 =  +8+49:;
<
;=!
>; + ?6 + @̅56 + B̅56	 (5) 
where 3756 is the outcome variable and +49:;  the l covariate (which also includes the additional 
socio-economic variables of the full model), ?6 a time dummy (=1 for wave 1), @̅56 is the 
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average of the fixed effects for those individuals in cohort c in the year of survey t and B̅56 is the 
random term. Note that @̅56 deals with unobserved individual heterogeneity while controlling for 
cohort effects and it can also average out individual measurement errors (Warunsiri and 
McNown, 2010). The critical assumption for consistency is that the average fixed effects 
approximates the true fixed effect (@̅56 ≈ @̅5). 
6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
(a) Estimations by gender and pseudo panel results 
In this section we present the paper's main findings. Table 3 summarizes the results by gender for 
each wave for all econometric specifications using the controls of equation (3). The basic finding 
from Table 3 is that early marriage in SSA is a powerful mechanism of transmission of education 
inequality for both girls and boys in both waves. In all econometric specifications, mother's early 
marriage status impairs their ability to transfer education to the next generation (for OLS, 
matching and IV). We also observe that early marriage has a negative and significant effect on 
primary completion and years of schooling, and a positive and significant impact on the 
likelihood to never have been to school and to enter primary education late (see columns (1-2), 
(4-5), (6-7), (9-10) of Table 3). This confirms the baseline hypothesis: low returns to schooling, 
increasing education costs and family income constraints resulting in lower education 
investments for young wives' children. Because of the controls employed, the effect of early 
marriage is net of family structure and health factors, school supply (captured by geographical 
location), community average infrastructure and its value to education (measured by parents in 
higher occupations who presumably are more motivated to send their children to school) and 
other community ecological health factors. Though all results (from Tables 3-8) and conclusions 
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should be interpreted with the standard caveat that they represent associations and do not 
necessarily imply causality. 
[Table 3 here] 
 Early marriage is a stronger barrier for access than to retention measures −i.e., its association 
with never been to school is larger than for completion and there are smaller effects for late 
entry. Early marriage has a major impact on zone 1 of education exclusion (those children who 
will never go to school) than on zone 2 indicators (primary drop-outs) and finally on zone 3 
indicators (children enrolled but a risk of dropping out or late entrants). For instance, OLS 
estimates (columns (1) and (6)) show that for girls there is a lower completion rate effect 
between 5%-3% while for never been to school this is twice as large (11%-6%). The larger 
impact on access could suggest that social norms and parental values on education may pose an 
influence of the same level as family credit constraints when taking decision on whether to send 
children to school. But opportunity costs are also important. In fact, the likelihood to enter school 
late (mostly linked with higher opportunity costs of schooling in terms of forgone paid-work) is 
around 1.7% higher for children from EMM. This holds back the efficiency of education systems 
as most late entrants end up dropping out (Wils, 2004) and can also create difficult multi-age 
learning situations for teachers and other students (Akyeampong 2005; Wang, 2011). 
By comparing gender estimates we can pin down any gender bias in educational investments 
through the impact of early marriage. Our estimates show that EMM's daughters −possibly 
because of lower aspirations or increasing dowry prices− are relatively more affected in their 
schooling opportunities than EMM's sons. For years of schooling there is a gap favouring boys 
(or a lower effect) of 0.07 (wave 2, column (6)) which in turn implies over a 1% higher negative 
effect for both completion rates and out-of-school rates for girls.  
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Because OLS estimates are averaged effects for treated and untreated children and may hide 
the extent of the early marriage driven inequality, we include in columns (2-3) and (8-9) of Table 
3 matching estimators.11 Double robust matching estimates lead to similar conclusions than OLS 
estimates. Importantly, by displaying the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as a 
percentage of the untreated potential outcome mean (columns (3) and (7)−ATT(%)) we put an 
emphasis on the scope of human capital investment inequalities driven by child marriage. For 
instance, in wave 2, girls whose mothers were married young (treated) are 32% more likely to be 
out of the school as compared to those whose mother married later on (untreated) and 11% fewer 
chances to finish primary. For boys, too, this disadvantage is of 31% and 6% for never been to 
school and completion as their counterparts, respectively. 
Results for IV estimations for the two sets of instruments are shown in columns (4-5) and 
columns (9-10) of Table 3 (top part). Of the two first stage specifications (columns (1-2) and 
columns (6-7) of the second part of Table 3), model 1 (m1) is preferred as the two instruments 
are statistically significant; female/male ratio turns out to be a non-significant instrument (model 
2, m2). This holds across samples. In the first stage, the community rate of child marriage for 
older cohorts is associated with 0.35 effect on child marriage and the effect of community 
prevalence of non-premarital sex is of 0.25 (wave 1). The impact of the instruments is slightly 
lower for the second wave. Instruments are not weak and correlated with the endogenous 
regressor (all Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic p-values are zero). Model 1's instruments are 
further supported by the test of overidentifying restrictions: using the Hansen-J statistics we 
accept the joint null hypothesis (p-values>0.10) that the instruments are valid instruments 
(uncorrelated with the error term) and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from 
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the estimated equation. We also reject the null of exogeneity in most cases supporting the central 
hypothesis of early marriage and education investments endogeneity. 
There is a substantial downward bias of OLS estimates −especially for never been to school 
and years of education indicators (e.g., never been to school OLS coefficient is 0.11 and  0.57 for 
IV; for years of education the OLS coefficient is -0.43 and -1.81 for IV, sample: wave 1 for 
girls). This is contrary to some expectations on the nature of unobservables (such as ability, 
value parents attach to education) which points towards an upper bias of OLS because of a 
positive correlation of unobservables with both early marriage and dependent variables. Yet 
unobservables might have a differential bearing across dependent variables. For example, low 
parental value attached to education is more openly linked to access to school but when a child is 
already in the school system other factors such as opportunity costs are brought into play. Similar 
explanations for the OLS downward bias in return to schooling are found in other developing 
countries (Warunsiri and McNown, 2010).  
Did early marriage-children's schooling inequality decrease between 2000 and 2010? A 
direct comparison of estimated coefficients of waves 1 and 2 of Table 3 shows that inequality 
had improved, with most coefficients halving in size. Yet a more qualified answer can be 
obtained from the pseudo panel analysis of Table 4. The Hausman test is used to choose between 
the fixed effects and random effects models. For the four dependent variables we reject the null 
that differences in coefficients are not systematic and so the fixed effect methods −addressing the 
issue of omitted variable bias arising from unobserved heterogeneity and at the same time 
controlling for cohort effects− are appropriate and the basis of our analysis.  
[Table 4 here] 
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Table 4 shows that, although the net effect of child marriage is still significant after 
accounting for cohort effects and additional socio-economic controls, an improvement in terms 
of lower transmission of education inequality has been achieved since Dakar. The interaction 
terms between early marriage and wave 2, time dummy are statistically significant (for all 
dependent variables except from overage) and of the right sign, nearly half of the size of the 
direct effect of the covariate early marriage. For the cohort of young wives' children born around 
the mid 90s, the pseudo panel estimates for access reveals a remarkable progress (total effect of 
just 2%). Though progression and achievement are still a concern with total negative effects of 
6% for primary completion and 0.30 years of schooling. This could partly be explained by the 
scaling up of policies fostering UPE in the region (such as fee abolition) but the neglect of 
incentives to keep children in schools coupled with rising indirect costs.  
(b) Indirect channels of education inequality transmission 
Our analysis shows significant evidence of a negative association between early marriage and 
children's schooling. Yet policies may be informed by differences on how low educational 
investments of young wives are broken down by sub-populations. These sub-populations define 
indirect channels and reveal the existence of heterogeneity on the mechanisms behind 
intergenerational transmission of education inequality or the impact of early marriage on 
children's education. Table 5 displays OLS estimates by four plausible hypothesis of 
transmission: education, health, empowerment and community characteristics. 
Estimates for the education channel are contained in Panel A of Table 5. In theory, the 
negative relationship that we estimate between early marriage and children's education could 
reflect the fact that EMM are less educated and hence the bias in the individual data estimates. 
Indeed, this seems to be the case. If either parent has low education, the children effect from the 
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event of mothers marrying young is to have higher chances of never been to school (of 6%) and 
not completing primary school (of 2%). Mother's literacy, too, is a powerful driver. This 
highlights that part of the main results of Table 3 are driven by low parental education, 
confirming the ability/motivation and family education environment components of transmission 
(see Section 2).  
[Table 5 here] 
The early marriage effect is found to also operate via poor family planning and a lack of 
antenatal and child care. Short birth spacing and lack of vaccinations might lead to lower 
parental investments and negative consequences on children cognitive abilities. Hence, estimates 
for the health channel (Panel B of Table 4) found some supports for the hypothesis that lower life 
spans, as well as lack of care around birth and nutrition deficits during pregnancy yield lower 
educational returns of EMM children, which in turn act as a disincentive for investments on 
education. Certainly, the effect of early marriage on primary completion is significant for a child 
in the group of household with short birth spacing but not statistically significant otherwise; the 
additional years of education lost for EMM children is twice as large if they have not received 
basic vaccinations (-0.25 versus -0.13).    
Moreover, we find that our estimates are not totally driven by lower empowerment of young 
wives (Panel C of Table 5); at least not as much as found for the education and health channels. 
Among young wives, an increase in empowerment in terms of decision making over patterns of 
household spending, mother's freedom of movement and power to negotiate sex, does not 
automatically lead to lower effects on children's education.12 There is, however, a positive gap 
for access: children of empowered young wives have, on average, a 2% lower chance to be out 
of school.  
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Although EMM lack of empowerment does not fully explain children's schooling decisions 
beyond access, indirectly EMM weight on intra-household decisions matters because of its' 
influence as mediators on the relationships of education, health and community factors with 
children's schooling. If EMM have some degree of empowerment, this can limit health, 
education and community effects on transmission of educational  inequalities. Table 6 supports 
this. It shows the effects (predictions) of the interactions between indicators of empowerment 
with the education, health and community pathways (of Table 5) for the sub-sample of young 
wives. Children of disadvantaged EMM (i.e., those young wives with low education, poor 
antenatal care, high fertility and living in poor communities) have between 4%-8% higher 
chances to access education if their mothers are more empowered than their counterparts 
(columns (1)-(4) of Table 6). Also, children of empowered EMM (with education, health and 
community setbacks) have higher completion rates by 1%-3% than the children of non-
empowered EMM ((columns (5)-(8)). Empowering of EMM can therefore wane other channels 
of transmission of education inequalities.  
[Table 6 here] 
Different sources of bias coming from communities are likely to be small as the results in 
Table 3 include community controls. We find that the effect of early marriage in rural 
communities is considerably larger for the indicator never been school and smaller for primary 
completion in comparison to urban communities (Table 5, Panel D), which may imply that the 
effect of early marriage is channelled by supply constraints. Likewise, primary and years of 
education impacts are larger for poor urban areas. In other words, community location and 
poverty matter more when it comes to children’s access to education. This is further supported 
by estimates by community fertility levels −that is, early marriage is not statistically associated 
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with children's primary completion in community with high fertility rates but on the contrary it 
has a large effect in low-fertility communities.. 
(c)  Effects of delaying early marriage among young wives 
Because of weak law enforcement on child marriage13, an intermediate step could be to raise the 
age of marriage amongst young wives by providing for girls at risk incentives to stay in school. 
In turn, this can benefit their children schooling prospect since, as earlier shown, mothers' 
education can minimize the transmission of inequalities. For example, an evaluation of an 
education subsidy program for upper primary school students in Kenya, Duflo, Dupas and 
Kremer (2014) find that it leads to reduction in adolescent girls’ dropout (from 19% to 16%), 
pregnancy (from 16% to 13%) and early marriage.  
We were interested in whether there are any potential benefits of delaying marriage for 
children's schooling, particularly among children of wives who had married very young. To 
answer this question, we follow a matching multi-treatment approach (Cattaneo, 2010; 
Wooldridge, 2010) to minimize the impact of observables in the selection of marriage at 
different ages. We define three treatments effects: married between age 10 and 14 (treatment 1, 
D = 1); married between age 15 to 17 (treatment 2, D = 2); and married after age 18 (treatment 
3, D = 3). That is, we have divided the early married treatment group into two additional 
treatment groups −women married at very young age and women married at an intermediate age. 
We estimate contrasting effects are the population-averaged treatment effects of getting 
treatment 2 instead of 1, treatment 3 instead of 1, and treatment 3 instead of 2.  
Estimates for the contrasting effects for wave 2 are shown in Table 7.14 We find that the 
effect of postponing age of marriage are substantial for children's likelihood to who have never 
been to school. Children would have had a reduced probability of 5.5% of never been to school if 
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their mothers had married between age 15-17 instead of marrying between age 10-14. This 
represents a 20% reduction of the total never been to school rate of 25% for EMM's children in 
wave 2 (see Table 2). Less effects are obtained in terms of years of attainment −an additional 
0.18 years of education (treatment contrast D = 2 and D = 1). As expected, estimates larger when 
contrasting treatments 3 and 1. Interestingly, as shown by Figure 3, the gains for children in 
terms of access to education are proportionally larger for moving from treatment 1 to treatment 
2, than moving from treatment 2 to treatment 3. Children's improvement in primary completion 
rates is also a function of mother's age of marriage, but marginal and significant achievement is 
only obtained from delaying age of marriage after 18 (i.e., CI of the contrast estimates of D = 2 
and D = 1 with D = 3 and D = 2 overlap). Overall, these findings strongly support policies 
holding back the age of marriage among the group women married at very young age as an 
attempt to cut back the transmission of inequality in terms of on access to education. 
 [Table 7 and Figure 3 here] 
(d) Community early marriage effect on non-young wives' children educational outcomes 
Child marriage may deter children's education investment more broadly regardless whether or 
not the child's mother had married young. In this section to isolate the impact of the community 
prevalence on child’s human capital investment we restrict our analysis to children of non-early 
married mothers. Estimates from Table 8 offer some evidence on the presence of negative 
externalities on parental human capital investments derived from living in community with a 
large prevalence of child marriage, leading to lower investments of children schooling. Even in 
the model with further socio-economic controls, the interaction term for mother's years of 
education and community prevalence has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
primary completion rates among children of non-early married mothers. The pathway from 
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mother's education, one of the major mechanism influencing a child’s educational attainment, is 
somewhat weakened for living in communities with high child marriage prevalence. This could 
imply that beyond school supply constraints in communities with high rates of early marriage, 
socio-cultural factors may also be operating to further impede non-EMM from investing in their 
children's schooling. 
[Table 8 here] 
(e) Robustness checks  
Estimates of Table 3 excludes socio-economic controls since those are observed ex-post to the 
decision of marriage and controlling for them can be an additional source of bias. We found 
earlier that individual and community socio-economic channels (measured by parental education 
and community poverty) are mediating factors on the transmission of intergenerational 
inequality. Hence, for robustness, Table 9 contains OLS, matching estimates and IV estimates 
for the whole sample with and without socio-economic controls (household's wealth, father's 
occupation, parental education, and community proportion of parents with secondary education) 
as well as models with community fixed effects.15 
[Table 9 here] 
On the one hand, still accounting for average socio-economic differences in households and 
communities, all estimates (i.e., of columns (6) to (9)) are statistically significant, although a 
comparison of the matching estimates of columns (3) and (8) shows that economic drivers 
greatly reduce the impact on the transmission of inequality. This agrees with the idea that socio-
economic factors are more prominent under more difficult circumstances. For example, while 
children have 33% higher chance to be out of school as compared to untreated individuals 
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(%ATT), for the same comparison for children with the same average household and community 
economic characteristics, this gap is reduced to 16% (wave 1).  
On the other hand, we test the robustness of our main results for community-level 
unobserved heterogeneity by controlling for community fixed effects. Estimates for fixed effects 
models are significant (column (5) and (10) of Table 9). Therefore, even after controlling for 
underlying differences in educational outcomes across communities, the analysis still shows that 
early marriage holds back the transfer of education over generations.16  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we investigated whether early marriage is associated with reduced educational 
opportunities for children, and how this relationship has changed over time since 2000 using two 
waves of DHS surveys for 25-32 countries from SSA.  
Our results can be summarised in four findings. First, regardless of the method we employed, 
early marriage in SSA is widely negatively associated with access and retention of children in 
education. Although there has been some improvement in terms of lowering its effects in the last 
decade, early marriage is still a strong driver of transmission of intergenerational inequality, 
particularly for access to school. This was also true when accounting for socio-economic 
constraints faced by the early married type of household. Second, the negative effect of early 
married affects girls more than boys, contributing to a widening of gender inequalities over 
generations. This could be due to cultural perceptions on women's role in society which 
translates into education gender bias. Third, we find that increasing the age of marriage among 
the youngest EMM can have substantial effects in terms of children's likelihood to be in school. 
Four, inequality on investments on child education is channelled through various pathways −i.e., 
mother's education, family planning, antenatal and post-natal care, empowerment for children's 
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access to school, and community in terms of education supply. Last, there is still a role of 
empowerment as an indirect mechanism that permeates through all channels of transmissions 
lessening education inequality. That is to say that children of EMM with low education and 
access to health services or poor family planning, for instance, are less likely to suffer in terms of 
their educational opportunities if their mothers have some degree of empowerment.  
Diagram 2. Summary of main findings 
We restate the paper's findings in Diagram 2, where we denote by the negative (-) and 
positive (+) signs the direction of the associations and the lack of association is shown by the 
symbol (o). Also, the letters a and c represent access and retention/completion measures, 
respectively. For example, the diagram illustrates that community location and poverty are 
negative mediating factors between early married mothers and children's education for access 
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indicators [-a]; for the indicator late entry, early married has larger (positive) effect for sons [++] 
than for daughters [+].  
The diagram also shows that community-level variables are important mediating factors 
between early marriage and children's educational outcomes. The significance of the community 
was demonstrated in our paper by the finding that, living in a community with a high prevalence 
of early marriage, also has an impact on the educational outcomes of children of mothers who do 
not enter marriage early.   
(a)  Policy recommendations and implications for the post-2015 agenda 
Our results underscore the importance of child marriage as one of the critical indicators related to 
intergenerational education effects in SSA. Target 4.5 under SDG4 (Education quality) makes a 
call to "eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of 
education and vocational training for the vulnerable", whilst for SDG5 (Gender equality) target 
5.3 states: “eliminate all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage...” (UN, 
2015). According to our analysis, the equity target for education will not be achieved unless 
policies which aim to reduce significantly the incidence of child marriage are introduced and 
monitored.   
As our analysis show, an intermediate step will be to raise the age of marriage amongst 
young wives by providing for girls at risk incentives to stay in school (see Baird, McIntosh and 
Özler, 2011 for the case of the Zomba Cash Transfer Programme in Malawi). This program 
deterred girls at higher risk of early marriage through education; girls who were not enrolled in 
school at baseline were 40 percent less likely to marry after receiving cash transfers conditional 
upon school enrolment (Lee-Rife et al., 2012). School level and community programmes which 
focus on the wider intergenerational benefits of completing education and marrying at a later age 
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should also be promoted. In addition, our estimates also show that an important step is to 
strengthen early married women empowerment to lessen the negative impact of education, health 
and community factors as drivers of education inequality transmission.  
Indeed, sensitivity to social expectations around early marriage is often due to a lack of 
empowerment (Bicchieri, Jiang and Lindemans, 2014) and having access to further schooling 
delaying marriage only works by promoting empowerment (Solanke, 2015). That is why many 
child marriage programs include empowerment initiative as a primary objective (Malhotra et al., 
2011) so that girls can reject it and possibly take the lead in the collective process of change. In a 
review of 23 programs seeking to address child marriage implemented between 1973 and 2009, 
Lee-Rife et al. (2012), found that that the strongest programs are those that worked directly with 
girls to address the multiple drivers of child marriage aiming for sustainable changes. An 
example of this type of programs is the Berhane Hewan program in Ethiopia which addressed 
social norms, girls’ lack of status and social capital, barriers to schooling, and economic factors, 
and which succeeded in reducing very early child marriage among girls aged 10–14 and increase 
girls' empowerment  (Lee-Rife et al., 2012).  
All in all, our results advocate for negative cultural practices and norms directed at girls have 
to be addressed through a combination of campaigns and incentives to ensure vulnerable girls 
enrol in school and stay on to complete at least a secondary level of education. Governments 
should work through community leaders and parents/households to raise awareness of the harm 
that early marriage does to girls in terms of their future prospects and impact on their children’s 
education, as well as through changes to the school curriculum, school processes, and by 
promoting practices which empower girls and ensure they reach higher levels of education. 
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Figure 1. Incidence of early marriage in SSA. Darker shaded countries indicate larger early marriage 
prevalence. Authors' calculation based on the DHS surveys, wave 2 
  
 
Figure 2. Children's never been to school and primary school rate in SSA. Darker shaded countries 
indicate larger rates. Authors' calculation based on the DHS surveys, wave 2 
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Figure 3. Multivalued treatment effects estimates comparison (wave 2) 
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Table 1. Sub-Saharan Africa's DHS surveys used 
Country Wave 1    Wave 2 
  Year N   Year N 
Benin 2001 7,633 2011 24,043 
Burkina Faso 1998 7,567 2010 21,873 
Burundi 2010 11,451 
Cameroon 1998 5,498 2011 14,901 
Chad 1996 7,488 2004 6,672 
Comoros 2011 6,012 
Congo 2005 7,225 2012 12,574 
Côte d’Ivoire 1998 2,927 2012 11,221 
D. R. Congo 2013 22,759 
Ethiopia 2000 16,754 2011 18,436 
Gabon 2000 6,160 2012 8,612 
Ghana 1998 5,284 2008 5,712 
Guinea 1999 8,653 2012 10,498 
Kenya 1998 8,823 2008 8,993 
Lesotho 2004 6,252 2009 6,814 
Liberia 2013 10,969 
Madagascar 2003 9,584 2008 21,203 
Malawi 2000 13,542 2010 28,117 
Mali 2001 14,463 2012 15,470 
Mozambique 2003 13,638 2011 16,152 
Namibia 2000 6,565 2006 8,874 
Niger 1998 9,752 2012 18,331 
Nigeria 1999 7,918 2013 45,191 
Rwanda 2000 10,261 2010 14,421 
Sao Tome and Principe 2008 3,013 
Senegal 2005 15,199 2010 18,156 
Sierra Leone 2013 19,343 
Swaziland 2006 4,133 
U. R. Tanzania 1999 4,253 2010 12,183 
Uganda 2000 8,164 2011 10,050 
Zambia 2001 8,238 2007 8,108 
Zimbabwe 1999 5,430   2010 8,774 
Notes: (1) Sample sizes refer to the working sample: mother's aged 30-39. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of children's schooling outcomes and covariates by marriage status 
Variables 
Wave 1 Wave 2 
Early 
married 
mothers 
Non-early 
married 
mothers   
Early 
married 
mothers 
Non-early 
married 
mothers 
Children's schooling outcomes 
Never been to school (%) 0.36 0.18 0.25 0.13 
Overage (%) 0.51 0.40 0.46 0.35 
Primary completion (%) 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.34 
Years of education 2.21 3.08 2.92 3.51 
Demographic factors 
Age 19.91 20.03 19.33 19.91 
Birth order - second or third 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.22 
Birth order - fourth 0.29 0.20 0.30 0.18 
Number of sisters 1.77 1.52 1.86 1.56 
Number of brothers 2.03 1.65 2.14 1.68 
Household head - male 0.85 0.80 0.84 0.80 
Mother work 0.68 0.70 0.67 0.70 
Mother - Muslim 0.36 0.23 0.32 0.21 
Mother's BMI 22.79 23.59 24.33 25.08 
Child sex - male 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.49 
Socio-economic factors 
Household wealth - Q1 0.24 0.18 0.25 0.17 
Household wealth - Q2 0.23 0.18 0.22 0.18 
Household wealth - Q3 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.19 
Household wealth - Q4 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.21 
Household wealth - Q5 0.12 0.23 0.13 0.26 
Father occupation - lower non farm 0.25 0.35 0.32 0.37 
Father occupation - upper non farm 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.23 
Mother education - at least some primary 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.29 
Mother education - at least some 
secondary 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.12 
Father education - at least some primary 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.24 
Father education - at least some secondary 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.10 
Community factors 
Number of children under 4 0.40 0.35 0.43 0.37 
Average stunting rate 0.36 0.32 0.32 0.28 
Underweight mothers (%) 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.07 
Rural community 0.79 0.67 0.77 0.63 
Development index -0.24 0.05 -0.18 0.18 
Parents with secondary education (%) 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.23 
Upper non-farm occupation - father (%) 0.63 0.67   0.48 0.68 
Notes: (1) Authors' calculations based on DHS surveys. Working sample: mother's aged 30-39. 
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Table 3. Summary of the impacts of early marriage on children's schooling outcomes. OLS, Double robust treatment effects, and IV results by gender  
  Female   Male 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  OLS ATT ATT (%) IV (m1) IV (m2)   OLS ATT ATT (%) IV (m1) IV (m2) 
Wave 1                       
Never been to school 0.107*** 0.096*** 0.324*** 0.567*** 0.587***   0.088*** 0.079*** 0.335*** 0.414*** 0.508*** 
N 13463 13463 13463 13463 13463   15171 15171 15171 15171 15171 
Overage 0.017*** 0.013** 0.031** 0.046 -0.043   0.008 0.002 0.004 -0.046 -0.02 
N 16856 16856 16856 16856 16856   22539 22539 22539 22539 22539 
Primary completion -0.051*** -0.042***  -0.195*** -0.218*** -0.175**   -0.055*** -0.043***  -0.163*** -0.095 -0.127** 
N 5477 5477 5477 5477 5477   11038 11038 11038 11038 11038 
Years of education  -0.428*** -0.394***  -0.154***   -1.808*** -2.021***   -0.389*** -0.334***  -0.120*** -1.377*** -1.645*** 
N 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148   16502 16502 16502 16502 16502 
Wave 2                       
Never been to school 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.319*** 0.451*** 0.544***   0.052*** 0.054*** 0.306*** 0.243*** 0.439*** 
N 29618 29618 29618 29618 29618   33330 33330 33330 33330 33330 
Overage 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.029*** -0.135*** -0.181***   0.019*** 0.010*** 0.020*** -0.009 -0.151*** 
N 44560 44560 44560 44560 44560   54654 54654 54654 54654 54654 
Primary completion -0.033*** -0.026***  -0.112***  -0.171* 0.166*   -0.023*** -0.018*** -0.063***  -0.239*** 0.037 
N 14131 14131 14131 14131 14131   22533 22533 22533 22533 22533 
Years of education  -0.261*** -0.259*** -0.083***  -1.710*** -0.563   -0.191*** -0.174***  -0.055*** -1.476*** -0.733**  
N 30365 30365 30365 30365 30365   35491 35491 35491 35491 35491 
Notes. (1) Models' controls. Demographic household characteristics (children age and birth order, number of daughters and boys at home, household head male, mother's working, 
mother's religion Muslim, mother's BMI); community health variables (average number of children under 4, average stunting rate, proportion of underweight mothers), dummy for 
rural community, community socio-economic variables (development index based on household assets and proportion of fathers in with upper non-farm occupation); and countries' 
dummies and GDP. (2) The average treatment on the treated (ATT) is estimated using Inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPRWA). The ATT(%)  indicates the 
ATT as a percentage of the untreated potential outcome mean.  (3) Instruments are community proportion measured as follows: non-premarital sex is the proportion of women who 
have not had sex before married in the 20-40 age group; past prevalence of early marriage is the proportion of women aged 40-49 who had married before age 18; and the gender 
ratio is the proportion of female/male in the 20-40 age group. Models specification are as follows: IV (m1) and IV (m2) include the instrument proportion of non-premarital sex, IV 
(m1) second instrument is past prevalence of early marriage and IV (m2) second instrument is female/male gender ratio. (4) Under identification tests are based on Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistic; over identification tests on Hansen J statistic; and the endogeneity tests on C-statistic. All IV models pass the under identification tests. We display in bold IV 
estimates supported by tests (i.e., where the over identification null is rejected and the endogeneity null is accepted).  
Standard errors clustered at the community level. * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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IV Tests and First Stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
IV model
First stage  
(m1)
First stage  
(m2)
Under 
identification 
test
Over 
identification 
test
Endogeneity 
test 
First stage  
(m1)
First stage  
(m2)
Under 
identification 
test
Over 
identification 
test
Endogeneity 
test 
Wave 1 
Never been to school 
past prevalence of early marriage IV (m1) 0.349*** 363.6 (0.00) 0.65 (0.42) 46.95 (0.00) 0.388*** 492.5 (0.00) 2.50 (0.11) 33.20 (0.00)
non-premarital sex 0.231*** 0.304*** 0.232*** 0.318***
female/male gender ratio IV (m2) 0.05 261.6 (0.00) 5.42 (0.02) 30.53 (0.00) -0.146 339.8 (0.00) 1.53 (0.22) 29.65 (0.00)
Overage
past prevalence of early marriage IV (m1) 0.290*** 269.1 (0.00) 2.56 (0.11) 0.38 (0.54) 0.305*** 405.5 (0.00) 2.14 (0.14) 1.04 (0.31) 
non-premarital sex 0.260*** 0.306*** 0.227*** 0.307***
female/male gender ratio IV (m2) -0.022 253.9 (0.00) 0.07 (0.79) 1.02 (0.31) -0.133 374.8 (0.00) 6.33 (0.01) 0.46 (0.50) 
Primary completion 
past prevalence of early marriage IV (m1) 0.327*** 106.8 (0.00) 1.40 (0.24) 4.09 (0.04) 0.360*** 335.1 (0.00) 0.27 (0.60) 0.61 (0.44) 
non-premarital sex 0.185*** 0.265*** 0.256*** 0.339***
female/male gender ratio IV (m2) -0.335** 78.8 (0.00) 1.93 (0.16) 2.10 (0.15) -0.166 288.6 (0.00) 1.62 (0.20) 1.73 (0.19) 
Years of education 
past prevalence of early marriage IV (m1) 0.347*** 324.3 (0.00) 0.10 (0.75) 22.83 (0.00) 0.371*** 538.4 (0.00) 1.42 (0.23) 15.00 (0.00)
non-premarital sex 0.217*** 0.303*** 0.253*** 0.333***
female/male gender ratio IV (m2) -0.051 250.6 (0.00) 7.62 (0.01) 20.03 (0.00) -0.121 409.5 (0.00) 2.16 (0.14) 17.48 (0.00)
Wave 2 
Never been to school 
past prevalence of early marriage IV (m1) 0.239*** 298.6 (0.00) 14.18 (0.00) 24.30 (0.00) 0.266*** 347.9 (0.00) 10.86 (0.00) 7.77 (0.01) 
non-premarital sex 0.150*** 0.210*** 0.108*** 0.192***
female/male gender ratio IV (m2) 0.024 268.7 (0.00) 0.01 (0.95) 36.54 (0.00) 0.062 249.2 (0.00) 0.27 (0.60) 24.49 (0.00)
Overage
past prevalence of early marriage IV (m1) 0.223*** 386.9 (0.00) 10.51 (0.00) 7.81 (0.01) 0.246*** 475.8 (0.00) 10.39 (0.00) 0.43 (0.51) 
non-premarital sex 0.167*** 0.231*** 0.107*** 0.209***
female/male gender ratio IV (m2) -0.084 432.7 (0.00) 7.17 (0.01) 17.01 (0.00) -0.01 435.2 (0.00) 9.96 (0.00) 12.74 (0.00)
Primary completion 
past prevalence of early marriage IV (m1) 0.204*** 90.7 (0.00) 1.04 (0.31) 1.78 (0.18) 0.238*** 192.8 (0.00) 1.80 (0.18) 7.52 (0.01) 
non-premarital sex 0.115*** 0.194*** 0.105*** 0.192***
female/male gender ratio IV (m2) -0.064 98.1 (0.00) 2.56 (0.11) 4.79 (0.03) 0.042 163.3 (0.00) 0.13 (0.72) 0.49 (0.48) 
Years of education 
past prevalence of early marriage IV (m1) 0.230*** 266.4 (0.00) 2.47 (0.12) 15.52 (0.00) 0.247*** 331.6 (0.00) 7.97 (0.00) 12.81 (0.00)
non-premarital sex 0.139*** 0.211*** 0.120*** 0.206***
female/male gender ratio IV (m2) -0.049 270.8 (0.00) 5.96 (0.01) 0.61 (0.44) 0.02 302.1 (0.00) 2.58 (0.11) 2.30 (0.13) 
Female Male 
Table 3. continued (second part) 
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Table 4. Pseudo panel estimates 
Never been to school Overage Primary completion Years of education 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects   
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects   
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects   
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Early marriage 0.160*** 0.233*** 0.061** 0.317*** -0.124*** -0.059 -0.800*** -0.618*** 
Wave 2 dummy 0.028 -0.001 0.022 0.042 -0.051*** -0.016 -0.182* 0.075 
Early marriage x 
wave 2 dummy -0.142*** -0.096**  -0.036 -0.166*** 0.064** 0.05 0.544*** 0.323 
Socio-economic 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.932*** 0.534*** -0.232** -1.419*** -1.603*** -1.560*** -8.555*** -4.981*** 
N 653 653 652 652 688 688 679 679 
R2 0.763 0.861 0.309 0.713 0.493 0.728 0.561 0.834 
Hausman test 
χ2(32) stat (p-val) 263.93 (0.00)   581.14 (0.00)   181.14 (0.00)   514.17 (0.00) 
Notes:  (1) Pseudo panel estimates are based on the sample of 25 countries observed in the two waves. The sample consists of mothers married between age 30 
and 49. (2) Models without socio-economic controls include the same explanatory variables as in Table 3. (3) Additional socio-economic controls are household 
level variables (wealth, father's occupation, and parental education) and community education (proportion of parents with secondary education).   
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Notes: (1) Same controls as in Table 3. (2) Low education category is defined as no education or incomplete 
primary; high education as some secondary and above. (3) Mother's literacy is based on her ability to read all or part 
of a sentence. Respondents who had attended at least some secondary school were assumed to be literate. (4) Short 
birth spacing is defined as when the preceding and succeeding birth intervals are less than 2 years. (5) Low height is 
defined as if mother height is below the country median and high otherwise. (6) Child vaccination includes the basic 
child vaccinations for BCG, DPT, measles and polio. (7) Antenatal visit hospital denotes if mother has attended pre-
birth controls at a health facility. (8) A women is defined as empowered (categorical variable equals to 1)  if she has 
a say on large household purchases, on her husband's earnings, on visits to family and whether she can refuse to 
have sex without condom, 0 if not empowered. (9) A community is defined as poor if the proportion of households 
in the bottom two quintiles wealth distribution is larger than a half. (10) A community lack of education quality is 
measured by the proportion of women who are non-literate after completing 5 or 6 years of school. (11) A 
community fertility is low if the fertility rate is in the distribution's bottom quartile; medium if it is between q25 and 
q75 and high if it is in top quartile. Community fertility rates are calculated using the Stata module tfr2 
(Schoumaker, 2013).   
Standard errors clustered at the community level. * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: education 
Low High Low High No Yes
Never been to school 0.066*** 0.019** 0.062*** 0.008 0.056*** 0.006*  
N 45155 6129 52689 7060 41340 21217
Primary completion -0.022*** -0.014 -0.019*** -0.009 -0.016*** -0.013
N 25102 4062 29317 4806 24036 12430
Years of education -0.215*** -0.085 -0.194*** -0.131** -0.166*** -0.069** 
N 46470 6497 54378 7665 43309 22157
Panel B: health 
No Yes No Yes No Yes Low High
Never been to school 0.052*** 0.071*** 0.060*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.054***
N 31427 11563 40033 10467 31263 7344 21450 21973 
Primary completion -0.013 -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.021*  -0.023*** -0.016 -0.021** -0.020** 
N 11673 5196 24231 5969 17331 3882 11976 12513 
Years of education -0.182*** -0.287*** -0.255*** -0.130*** -0.194*** -0.172*** -0.201*** -0.242*** 
N 26040 10869 42491 10921 31831 7705 22210 22884 
Panel C: mother's empowerment measures
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Never been to school 0.044*** 0.062*** 0.044*** 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.051*** 0.063***
N 29730 28106 23594 31790 35557 22226 34385 18762 
Primary completion -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.029*** -0.021** -0.022*** -0.030*** 
N 17110 16018 13677 18262 20684 12426 19738 10388 
Years of education -0.213*** -0.207*** -0.176*** -0.249*** -0.204*** -0.224*** -0.186*** -0.226*** 
N 30733 29359 24424 33016 37067 22971 35669 19790 
Panel D: community characteristics
Urban Rural No Yes No Yes Low Medium High
Never been to school 0.027*** 0.067*** 0.041*** 0.073*** 0.044*** 0.053*** 0.027*** 0.051*** 0.078***
N 17194 45754 35066 27882 20482 42466 12990 30473 15853
Primary completion -0.047*** -0.019*** -0.037*** -0.012*  -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.061*** -0.016** -0.01
N 10459 26205 20885 15779 12343 24321 8066 17973 8517
Years of education -0.289*** -0.204*** -0.226*** -0.212*** -0.271*** -0.182*** -0.292*** -0.165*** -0.218***
N 18003 47853 37085 28771 22047 43809 13963 32181 15852
education quality
Community location Community poor Community fertilityCommunity lack of 
Spend large purchases Spend husband income Visit family Refuse sex 
(empowered) (empowered) (empowered) (empowered)
Short birth spacing Child vaccinations Antenatal visits (hosp) Mother height 
Table 5. Impact of early marriage by sub-samples (wave 2). OLS estimates
Father education Mother education Mother literate  
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Notes: (1) Same controls as in Table 3. 
Standard errors clustered at the community level. * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Table 6. Impact (linear predictions) of empowerement on education, health and community channels (wave 2 - early married sample). OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pathway - education
Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered
Spend large purchases 0.219 0.284 0.243 0.309 0.218 0.211 0.224 0.219
P-value of Wald test on coefficents
N
Visit family 0.228 0.290 0.254 0.313 0.214 0.215 0.221 0.221
P-value of Wald test on coefficents
N
Refuse sex 0.229 0.299 0.255 0.319 0.229 0.202 0.238 0.204
Test F-stat (p-val)
N 25,137 25,592 15,952
Pathway - health
Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered
Spend large purchases 0.238 0.297 0.275 0.328 0.212 0.209 0.158 0.216
P-value of Wald test on coefficents
N
Visit family 0.257 0.289 0.293 0.327 0.206 0.216 0.172 0.220
P-value of Wald test on coefficents
N
Refuse sex 0.245 0.321 0.290 0.328 0.215 0.208 0.200 0.182
P-value of Wald test on coefficents
N
Pathway - community
Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered Empowered Not empowered
Spend large purchases 0.249 0.330 0.229 0.296 0.214 0.223 0.253 0.247
P-value of Wald test on coefficents
N
Visit family 0.261 0.333 0.240 0.298 0.219 0.221 0.252 0.247
P-value of Wald test on coefficents
N
Refuse sex 0.266 0.340 0.240 0.307 0.227 0.203 0.266 0.232
P-value of Wald test on coefficents
N
16,361
17,99817,99827,87527,875
25,742 25,742 16,437 16,437
20,691 16,727 9,291 10,491
27,897 27,897 18,009 18,009
10,237 10,830
10,82110,23117,33722,455
27,724 17,066 17,914
26,746 27,702 17,050 17,901
0.000.00
0.00 0.00 0.34 0.44
0.00 0.04 0.66 0.33
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.550.80
0.00 0.01 0.79 0.00
0.01 0.07 0.48 0.00
22,477 17,355
0.84 0.95
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poverty Lack of education quality Poverty Lack of education quality
0.00 0.00 0.28 0.51
0.00
Short birth spacing Antenatal visit (hosp)
Never been to school Primary completion
Mother education low Mother non-literate
Short birth spacing Antenatal visit (hosp)
26,773
0.00
Mother education low Mother non-literate
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Table 7. Multivalued average treatments effects comparisons (wave 2) 
Never Primary completion Years of education 
  Contrast Std error   Contrast Std error   Contrast Std error 
t=2 vs t=1 
Married between age 15 to 17 
vs married between age 10 to 
14 -0.055*** 0.005 -0.009 0.006 0.182*** 0.024 
t=3 vs t=1 
Married at age 18 or older vs 
married between age 10 to 14 -0.086*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.006 0.339*** 0.022 
t=3 vs t=2 
Married age 18 or older  vs 
married between age 15 to 17 -0.031*** 0.004 0.031*** 0.006 0.158*** 0.020 
N 62948     36664     65856   
Notes: (1) Same controls as in Table 3. (2) Delta-method standard errors. * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table 8. Effect of early community prevalence on educational intergenerational effects - OLS estimates for children of non-young married mothers 
Wave 1 Wave 2 
  
Primary 
completion 
Years of 
education 
Primary 
completion 
Years of 
education   
Primary 
completion 
Years of 
education 
Primary 
completion 
Years of 
education 
Mother's years of schooling 0.034*** 0.157*** 0.022*** 0.131*** 0.027*** 0.137*** 0.010*** 0.101*** 
Community early marriage x 
mother's years of schooling -0.021*** 0.005 -0.019*** 0.001 -0.008** -0.005 -0.007* -0.015 
Socio-economic controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
R2 0.218 0.341 0.264 0.395 0.219 0.328 0.266 0.373 
N 5859 11634 5859 11634   15132 29637 15132 29637 
Notes: (1) Models without socio-economic controls include the same explanatory variables as in Table 3. (2) Additional socio-economic controls are household 
level variables (wealth, father's occupation, and parental education) and community education (proportion of parents with secondary education).   
Standard errors clustered at the community level. * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 9. Whole sample impacts of early marriage on children's schooling outcomes.  
OLS and Matching (waves 1 and 2). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  OLS ATT ATT (%) IV OLS OLS ATT ATT (%) IV OLS 
Wave 1 
Never been to school (N=28634) 0.097*** 0.088*** 0.331*** 0.481*** 0.018*** 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.165*** 0.320*** 0.010* 
ICC (rho) 0.708 0.638 
Primary completion (N=16515) -0.054*** -0.043***  -0.173***  -0.126** -0.036*** -0.018***  -0.012** -0.053**  0.033 -0.023*** 
ICC (rho) 0.589 0.606 
Years of education (N=29650) -0.406*** -0.362*** -0.134*** -1.548*** -0.169*** -0.160*** -0.140*** -0.057*** -0.544*** -0.108*** 
ICC (rho) 0.526 0.48 
Socio-economic controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects No No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Wave 2 
Never been to school (N=62984) 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.316*** 0.340*** 0.020*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.200*** 0.176*** 0.016*** 
ICC (rho) 0.44 0.41 
Primary completion (n=36664) -0.027*** -0.021***  -0.079***  -0.223*** -0.021*** -0.007 -0.003 -0.013 -0.034 -0.011*   
ICC (rho) 0.45 0.435 
Years of education (N=65856) -0.223***  -0.212*** -0.067*** -1.586*** -0.135*** -0.115*** -0.099*** -0.033*** -0.515**  -0.085*** 
ICC (rho) 0.433 0.409 
Socio-economic controls No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community fixed effects No No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Notes:  (1) Models without socio-economic controls include the same explanatory variables as in Table 3. (2) Additional socio-economic controls are household 
level variables (wealth, father's occupation, and parental education) and community education (proportion of parents with secondary education).  (3) IV is model 
m1 with the community instruments past prevalence of early marriage and non-premarital sex. IV estimates are shown in bold is they pass over identification and 
endogeneity tests. (4) The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) is the proportion of the total variation of schooling outcomes attributed to communities. 
Standard errors clustered at the community level. * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 The Convention of the Rights of the Child can be found at: http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30160.html. 
 
2 Women 's empowerment is a multidimensional concept that it has been alternatively referred as: the power to 
make choices or the ability to access the components of life (such as education, employment and health care) or 
the relative position of power within the gender system (see Imai et al., 2014, for details). 
 
3 Indeed, our the working sample EMM have 1.04 and 0.87 fewer years of education than their counterparts in 
waves 1 and 2, respectively (see Section 4).  
 
4 Pasquier-Doumer and Risso Brandon (2015), for instance, find that living in rural areas is negatively 
associated with educational aspirations for indigenous children at age 8 in Peru, and as children become older, 
there is a pro-boy aspiration in rural areas. 
 
5 The notation closely follows section 2 of Fafchamps et al. (2009). 
 
6 This classification follows CREATE (http://www.create-rpc.org/about/exclusion/) Zones of Exclusion. It 
consists of six zones: those who will never go to school (Zone 1), those who start but do not finish (Zone 2), and 
those who do participate but attend infrequently, are overage, and are low achieving (Zone 3); those who fail to 
transit to secondary school (Zone 4), and those who drop out from secondary (Zone 5), or those who participate 
and learn little (Zone 6). 
 
7 Using a higher lower bound of the age group for the indicators never been to school and primary completion 
indicators provides a more stable group as it accounts for children who either may enter or finish later than 
expected.  
 
8 In a full specification we add more socio-economic controls at the household (wealth, father's occupation, and 
parental education) and community level (proportion of parents with secondary education). Note that these 
covariates are potentially endogenous. For instance, household wealth is the current level of household wealth 
for women aged 30-39 and thus are likely an outcome of the previous marriage decision. That is why these 
covariates are not used in our main specification, although we include them as further controls in a sensitivity 
analysis (see Section 5). 
 
9 A key assumption in the matching method is the conditional independence assumption (CIA), which implies 
that selection into treatment is solely based on observable characteristics. Another key condition is the common 
support or overlap condition which ensures that for each treated unit there are control units with the same 
observables: 0< Pr( = 1|+) < 1. 
 
10 A similar criteria for the construction of pseudo panels for pooled DHS data is used by Ziegelhöfer (2014). 
 
11 Estimated densities of the propensity score distributions for different education indicators for treated and 
untreated girls and boys (available from the authors upon request), reveal major overlap for treated and 
untreated groups (indicating the possibility of existence of a match) with regions of common support between 
0.2 and 0.8. Thus, our models show a satisfactory match by visual observation.  
 
12 It should be noted that some studies find that empowerment indicators based on the DHS do not always lead 
to better development outcomes (e.g., Upadhyay and Karasek, 2012) and so results for the empowerment 
channel should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
 
13 In 2010, 158 countries had laws establishing the legal age of marriage for women without parental consent as 
18, yet in 146 countries laws permit girls to marry younger than 18 with the parental consent or other authorities 
(Loaiza and Wong,, 2012). Thus laws that prohibit child marriage without exceptions are missing in many 
countries.  Also it is estimated that in 74 countries which have reported to the Compulsory Registration Act have 
no yet set the minimum age for marriage (Right to Education Project, 2013). Another issue is that often the law 
is avoided as birth certificates are forged by bribed corrupt officials to facilitate child marriages (HRW, 2015). 
 
14 It is important to note that our analysis do not encounter any common support problem with larger values at 
either zero or one for conditional densities. 
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15 We also carry out  estimates by SSA regions, not reported due to space constrains. We find that the extent of 
transmission of  inequality is more problematic in Western Africa (WA) as compared to Middle Africa (MA) 
and Eastern Africa (EA), while in Southern Africa (SA) the effect is null.  For example, the negative impact of 
child marriage is of 0.33 years of schooling in WA while in MA (0.2) and EA (0.14) (wave 2). Full OLS and 
matching results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
16 For space limitation, we do not report specific covariates' effects. OLS estimations for the whole sample are 
available from the authors upon request.. 
